|
Post by dans on Jul 19, 2023 17:10:26 GMT
Reading a WW2 era story, and a pair of axis agents are spying on a top secret meeting. One has a pair of binoculars while the other is asking the first one to tell him what is going on in the meeting. I wonder why they didn't just get two sets of binoculars?
|
|
|
Post by DocQuantum on Jul 19, 2023 21:53:28 GMT
Why do you only ever see one guy with a shovel at a construction site, while a bunch of other guys are just standing around watching him dig? Probably a different situation, but funny nonetheless.
My guess is the man with the binoculars is relating the information, while the other man should be writing down that info in a notebook.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Jul 19, 2023 23:31:23 GMT
Binoculars were not common place items in WWII as they were expensive. In actuality the German had the best. The US army actually imported the lenses from Germany before the war for its tanks and binoculars for the troops. Afterwards it had to find a home grown company and the quality was not as good as I understand it.
|
|
|
Post by dans on Jul 19, 2023 23:43:31 GMT
thank you, Dave! I was wondering if it might just be that binoculars were so uncommon...
|
|
|
Post by johnreiter902 on Jul 19, 2023 23:44:57 GMT
Also, if you are undercover in a dangerous situation, you want to carry as little as possible. Every item you bring is an item you can lose and can be used to identify you later.
|
|
|
Post by redsycorax on Jul 19, 2023 23:56:30 GMT
I imagine that the item would have to be easily disposable in such a context. More than one such item would be slightly more difficult to off-hand in case of apprehension. I work in my national Department of Justice. Although this applies to firearms primarily, it's an habitual modus operandi for criminals undertaking burglary- if you're engaged in breaking and entry, leave as few clues as to your identity or probable location otherwise it could be forensically traced later on. I imagine analogous principles would apply in the context of espionage and tracing and identifying adversarial field operatives.
|
|